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Intelligent Agents
Intelligent Agents I
According to a classical definition, an intelligent agent is a computational
system capable of autonomous action and perception in some environment
Reminder: computational autonomy
agents are autonomous as they encapsulate (the thread of) control
control does not pass through agent boundaries
only data (knowledge, information) crosses agent boundaries
agents have no interface, cannot be controlled, nor can they be
invoked
looking at agents, MAS can be conceived as an aggregation of
multiple distinct loci of control interacting with each other by
exchanging information
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Intelligent Agents
Intelligent Agents II
Question: what about the other notions of autonomy?
autonomy with respect to other agents – social autonomy
autonomy with respect to environment – interactive autonomy
autonomy with respect to humans – artificial autonomy
autonomy with respect to oneself – moral autonomy
. . .
Question: what is intelligence to autonomy?
any sort of intelligence?
which intelligence for which autonomy?
which intelligent architecture for which autonomy?
. . .
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Intelligent Agents
Actions and Perception
actions are supposed to change the environment in order to meet
agents design objectives
perception is a process by which the agent recognises the state of the
environment, so as to be able to adapt its behaviour to it
ENVIRONMENT
AGENT(s)
Actions Perception
[Russell and Norvig, 2002]
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Intelligent Agents
the perception function is the agent’s ability to observe its
environment
the outcome of the perception function is a percept
Perception : E → Per
which maps environment states to percepts
the action function represents the agent’s decision making process
the outcome of the action function is an action
Action : Per∗ → Ac
which maps sequences of percepts to actions
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Intelligent Agents
Autonomy
as we know, the main point about agents is they are autonomous:
capable of acting independently, encapsulating control over their
internal state.
thus, an agent is a computer system capable of autonomous actions in
some environment
what about agent behaviour? The most typically-mentioned features
are
reactivity
situatedness
pro-activeness
social ability
which, as we already know, can be somehow reduced to autonomy
itself
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Intelligent Agents
Reactivity
application in real world domains are characterised by highly dynamic
conditions: situations change, information is incomplete, resources are
scarce, the actions performed are not deterministic in their effects
a reactive system is one that maintains an ongoing interaction with
its environment, and responds to changes that occur in it—in time for
the response to be useful
purely reactive agents decide what to do without reference to their
history
reaction is entirely based on the present, with no reference to past
states
e.g. stimolous → response rules
action : E → Ac
a thermostat is a purely reactive agent
Andrea Omicini (DISI, Univ. Bologna) C4 – Intentional Agents A.Y. 2016/2017 9 / 69
Intelligent Agents
Situatedness
reactive models and state-less agency are not enough for entities
engaged in dynamic environments
such entities continually face with external events requiring adequate
services and behavioural responses
any “ground” model of action is strictly coupled with the context
where the action takes place
an agent comes with its own model of action
any agent is then strictly coupled with the environment where it lives
and (inter)acts by the very actions it is capable of
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Intelligent Agents
Proactiveness
we need agents able to smartly adapt to their environment
autonomously (re)adapting to changes
recognising opportunities
goal-oriented behaviour
proactiveness is a generative approach
agents generate their objectives, and attempt to achieve them
agents encapsulate control, and the rule to govern it
agents are not driven solely by stimuli
agents take the initiative and make something happen, rather than
waiting for something to happen
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Intelligent Agents
Social Ability
MAS can be conceived as an articulated world
where we cannot go around attempting to achieve goals without taking
other entities into account
some goals can only be achieved with the cooperation of others
thus, social ability in agents is the ability to interact with other agents
(and possibly humans) via some kind of agent-communication means
speech acts [Searle, 1969]
artifact-based interactions [Omicini et al., 2004]
signals
environment traces [Parunak, 2006]
. . .
coordination is social: cooperation, collaboration, but also
competition with others
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Intelligent Agents
Agents with State
to face these growing complexities, stateful agents can be conceived
these agents have some internal data structure, which is typically
used to record information about the environment state and history
let I be the set of all internal states of the agent: the perception
function is the same
Perception : E → Per
while the action-selection function action is defined as a mapping
Action : I → Ac
from internal states to actions
an additional function next is introduced, which maps an internal
state and percept to an internal state:
Next : I x Per → I
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Intelligent Agents
Implementing an Agent with Internal State
Agent control loop (v. 1)
1: while true
2: observe the environment state ’e’ and generates a perception(e);
3: update internal state model:
i ::= next(i, perception(e));
4: select an action to execute:
action(i);
5: end while
we now have the problem to define such agent states
how to build an effective internal state model?
how to make it run?
how to update it?
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Intentional Systems
Intentional Systems
an idea is to refer to human attitudes as intentional notions
when explaining human activity, it is often useful to make statements
such as the following:
Seb got rain tires because he believed it was going to rain
Kimi is working hard because he wants to win world championship
again
these statements can be read in terms of folk psychology, by which
human behaviour can be explained and can be predicted through the
attribution of mental attitudes, such as believing and wanting (as in
the above examples), hoping, fearing, and so on.
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Intentional Systems
The Intentional Stance
the philosopher – cognitive scientist – Daniel Dennett coined the term
intentional system to describe entities ‘whose behaviour can be
predicted by the method of attributing to it belief, desires and
rational acumen’ [Dennett, 1971]
Dennett identifies several grades of intentional systems:
1 a first-order intentional system has beliefs, desires, etc.
Seb believes P
2 a second-order intentional system has beliefs, desires, etc. about
beliefs, desires, etc. both its own and of others
Seb believes that Kimi believes P
3 a third-order intentional system is then something like
Seb believes that Kimi believes that Seb believes P
4 . . .
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Intentional Systems
The Intentional Stance in Computing
What entities can be described in terms of intentional stance?
human beings are prone to provide an intentional stance to almost
anything
sacrifices for ingratiating gods benevolence
animism
. . .
Ascribing mental qualities to machines [McCarthy, 1979]
Ascribing mental qualities like beliefs, intentions and wants to
a machine is sometimes correct if done conservatively and is
sometimes necessary to express what is known about its state
[...] it is useful when the ascription helps us understand the
structure of the machine, its past or future behaviour, or how to
repair or improve it
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Agents with Mental States
Agents as Intentional Systems
as computer systems become ever more complex, we need more
powerful abstractions and metaphors to explain their operation
with complexity growing, mechanist / low level explanations become
impractical
the intentional notions can be adopted as abstraction tools, providing
us with a convenient and familiar way of describing, explaining, and
predicting the behaviour of complex systems
the idea is to use the intentional stance as an abstraction in
computing in order to explain, understand, drive the behaviour—then,
crucially, program computer systems
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Agents with Mental States
Agents as Intentional Systems
Strong notion of agency
early agent theorists start from a (strong) notion of agents as
intentional systems
agents were explained in terms of mental attitudes, or mental states
in their social abilities, agents simplest consistent description implied
the intentional stance
agents contain an explicitly-represented – symbolic – model of the
world (written somewhere in the working memory)
agents make decision on what action to take in order to achieve their
goals via symbolic reasoning
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Agents with Mental States
Which Domains for Intention Systems? I
Mental states are a worth abstraction for developing agents to effectively
act in a class of application domains characterised by various practical
limitations and requirements [Rao and Georgeff, 1995]
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Agents with Mental States
Which Domains for Intention Systems? II
at any instant of time there are many different ways in which an
environment may evolve—the environment is not deterministic
at any instant of time there are many actions or procedures the agent
may execute—the agent is not deterministic, too
at any instant of time the agent may want to achieve several
objectives
the actions or procedures that (best) achieve the various objectives
are dependent on the state of the environment—i.e., on the particular
situation, context
the environment can only be sensed locally
the rate at which computations and actions can be carried out is
within reasonable bounds to the rate at which the environment
evolves
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Agents with Mental States
Goal-Oriented & Goal-Directed Systems
there are two main families of architectures for agents with mental
states
teleo-reactive / goal-oriented agents are based on their own design
model and internal control mechanism. The goal is not
explicitly represented within the internal state, instead it
is an ‘end state’ for agents internal state machine
deliberative / goal-directed agents are based on symbolic reasoning
about goals, which are explicitly represented and
processed aside the control loop
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Agents with Mental States
Modelling Agents with Mental States I
Modelling agents based on mental states. . .
eases the development of agents exhibiting complex behaviour
provides us with a familiar, non-technical way of understanding and
explaining agents
allows the developer to build MAS by adopting the perspective of a
cognitive entity engaged in complex tasks—e.g., what would I do in
the same situation?
simplifies the construction, maintenance, and verification of
agent-based applications
is useful when the agent has to comunicate and interact with users or
other system entities
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Agents with Mental States
Modelling Agents with Mental States II
The intentional stance [Dennett, 2007]
The intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting the
behaviour of an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by
treating it as if it were a rational agent who governed its ‘choice’
of ‘action’ by a ‘consideration’ of its ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’.
The scare-quotes around all these terms draw attention to
the fact that some of their standard connotations may be set
aside in the interests of exploiting their central features: their
role in practical reasoning, and hence in the prediction of the
behaviour of practical reasoners.
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Agents with Mental States
Modelling Agents with Mental States III
Agents with mental states
agents governing their behaviour based on internal states that mimic
cognitive (human) mental states
epistemic states representing agents knowledge—their knowledge on
the world
i.e., percepts, beliefs
motivational states representing agents objectives—what they aim to
achieve
i.e., goals, desires
the process of selecting one action to execute among the many
available based on the actual mental states is called practical
reasoning
i.e., action(next(i , perception(e))
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Practical vs. Epistemic Reasoning
practical reasoning is reasoning directed towards actions—the process of
figuring out what to do in order to achieve what is desired
[Bratman, 1987]
Practical reasoning is a matter of weighing conflicting considerations for
and against competing options, where the relevant considerations are
provided by what the agent desires/values/cares about and what the agent
believes.
epistemic reasoning is reasoning directed towards knowledge—the process
of updating information, replacing old information (no longer
consistent with the world state) with new information
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Practical Reasoning
practical reasoning consists of two main cognitive activities
deliberation when the agent makes decision on what state of affairs
the agent desire to achieve
means-ends reasoning when the agent makes decisions on how to
achieve these state of affairs
the outcome of the deliberation phase are the intentions
what agent desires to achieve, or what he desires to do
the outcome of the means-ends reasoning phase is the selection a
given course of actions
the workflow of the actions the agent intends to adopt in order to
achieve its own goals expressed as intentions
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Basic Architecture of a Mentalistic Agent
Perception
Action
Plans
Reasoning
Beliefs
Agent
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
The Role of Intentions in Practical Reasoning I
1 intentions represent a problem to solve for the agent who need to
determine how to achieve them
if I have an intention to φ, you would expect me to devote resources to
deciding how to bring about φ.
2 intentions provide a filter for adopting other intentions, which must
not conflict
if I have an intention to φ, you would not expect me to adopt an
intention ψ such that φ and ψ are mutually exclusive
3 intentions tend to be stable: agents track the success of their
intentions, and are inclined to try again if their attempts fail
if an agent’s first attempt to achieve φ fails, then all other things being
equal, it will try an alternative plan to achieve φ
4 agents believe their intentions are possible
that is, they believe that there is at least some way that the intentions
could be brought about
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
The Role of Intentions in Practical Reasoning II
5 agents do not believe they will not bring about their intentions.
it would not be rational for me to adopt an intention to φ if I believed
φ was not possible.
6 under certain circumstances, agents believe they will bring about their
intentions
it would not normally be rational of me to believe that I would bring
my intentions about; intentions can fail
moreover, it does not make sense that if I believe φ is inevitable that I
would adopt it as an intention
7 agents need not intend all the expected side effects of their intentions
if I believe φ→ ψ and I intend that φ, I do not necessarily intend ψ also
→ intentions are not closed under implication
this last problem is known as the side effect or package deal problem: I
may believe that going to the dentist involves pain, and I may also
intend to go to the dentist—but this does not imply in any way that I
intend to suffer pain
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Intentions vs. Desires
the adoption of an intention follows the rise of a given desire
i.e., it follows the adoption of a given goal
desires and intentions are different concepts
“My desire to play basketball this afternoon is merely a potential
influencer of my conduct this afternoon. It must live with my other
relevant desires [...] before it is settled what I will do”.
“In contrast, once I intend to play basketball this afternoon, the matter
is settled: I normally need not continue to weigh the pros and cons.
When the afternoon arrives, I will normally just proceed to execute my
intentions.” [Bratman, 1990]
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Means-Ends Reasoning I
the basic idea is to provide agents with three sorts of representations
representation of goal / intention to achieve
representation of actions / plans – in repertoire
representation of the environment
given the environmental conditions, means-ends reasoning aims at
devising out a plan that could possibly achieve the adopted goal /
intention
the selected intention is an emergent property, reified at runtime by
selecting a given plan for achieving a given goal
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Means-Ends Reasoning II
Means-Ends
  (planner)
Tasks
(Goals/Intentions)
State of Environment
(Beliefs)
Possible Actions
(Plan library)
Intention /
Plan to Achieve a 
Goal
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Implementing a Practical Reasoning Agent I
Agent control loop (v. 2)
1: while true
2: observe the world;
3: update internal world model (beliefs);
4: deliberate which intention to adopt next;
5: use means-ends reasoning to get a plan for the given intention;
6: execute the plan;
7: end while;
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Implementing a Practical Reasoning Agent: Issues I
Problem
Agents have bounded resources—what is called bounded rationality
deliberation and means-ends processes are not for free: they have
computational costs
the time taken to reason and the time taken to act are potentially
unbounded
→ this harms agent fitness—that is, the reactivity and the promptness
that is essential for the agent to survive
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Implementing a Practical Reasoning Agent: Issues II
if the agent
starts deliberating at t0
begins means-ends at t1
begins executing a plan at t2
ends executing a plan at t3
then
time for deliberation is
tdeliberation = t1 − t0
time for means-ends reasoning is
tmeansend = t2 − t1
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Implementing a Practical Reasoning Agent: Issues III
agents environments are supposed to be highly dynamic
many concurrent changes may occur during agent decision-making as
well as during the execution of plans
the deliberated intention is surely worth to be pursued at the precise
time when it the deliberation process starts—so, at t0
at time t1, the agent selects a goal/intention that would have been
optimal if it had been achieved at t0
the agent runs the risk that the intention selected is no longer optimal
– or no longer achievable – by the time the agent has committed to it
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Implementing a Practical Reasoning Agent: Issues IV
So, this agent will exhibit an overall optimal behaviour in the following
circumstances / under the following conditions:
1 when deliberation and means-ends reasoning take a vanishingly-small
amount of time
2 when the world is guaranteed to remain (essentially) static while the
agent is deliberating and performing means-ends reasoning, so that
the assumptions upon which the choice of intention to achieve and
plan to achieve the intention remain valid until the agent has
completed both deliberation and means-ends reasoning
3 when an intention that is optimal when achieved at t0 – the time at
which the world is observed – is guaranteed to remain optimal until
t2—the time at which the agent has found a course of action to
achieve the intention
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BDI Agents
The BDI Framework I
According to [Dasgupta and Ghose, 2011]
one of the most popular and successful framework for agent
technology is defined by Rao and Georgeff [Rao and Georgeff, 1992]
there, the notions of belief, desire, and intention are the core ones
hence, agents in this framework are typically referred to as BDI agents
Andrea Omicini (DISI, Univ. Bologna) C4 – Intentional Agents A.Y. 2016/2017 43 / 69
BDI Agents
The BDI Framework II
beliefs represent at any time the agent’s current knowledge about
the world, including
information about the current state of the environment
inferred from perception devices
messages from other agents
internal information
desires represent a state of the world the agent is trying to achieve
intentions are the chosen means to achieve the agent’s desires, and are
generally implemented as plans and post-conditions
as in general it may have multiple desires, an agent can
have a number of intentions active at any one time
these intentions may be thought of as running
concurrently, with one chosen intention active at any
one time
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BDI Agents
The BDI Framework III
Besides these components, the BDI model includes
plan library — namely, a set of “recipes” representing the procedural
knowledge of the agent
event queue — where
events — either perceived from the environment or
generated by the agent itself to notify an update of its
belief base
internal subgoals — generated by the agent itself while
trying to achieve a desire
are stored.
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BDI Agents
The BDI Framework IV
Plans & plan library
usually, BDI-style agents do no adopt first principles planning at all
all plans must be generated by the agent programmer at design time,
which are then selected for execution at run time
pre-programmed plans are collected in the plan library
the planning done by agents consists entirely of context-sensitive
subgoal expansion, which is deferred until a subgoal is selected for
execution
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BDI Agents
The BDI Abstract Architecture
Accordingly, the abstract architecture proposed by [Rao and Georgeff, 1992]
comprise three dynamic and global structures representing agent beliefs,
desires, and intentions (BDI), along with an input queue of events
update (write) and query (read) operations are possible upon the
three structures
update operation are subject to compatibility requirements
formalised constraints hold upon the mental attitudes
the events that the system is able to recognise could be either
external – i.e., coming from the environment – or internal ones—i.e.,
coming from some reflexive action
events are assumed to be atomic, and can be recognised after they
have occurred
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BDI Agents
Implementing a BDI Agent I
Agent control loop (v. 3) [Rao and Georgeff, 1995]
1. initialize-state();
2. while true do
3. options := option-generator(event-queue);
4. selected-options := deliberate(options);
5. update-intentions(selected-options);
6. execute();
7. get-new-external-events();
8. drop-successful-attitudes();
9. drop-impossible-attitudes();
10. end-while
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BDI Agents
Implementing a BDI Agent II
1 the agent initialises the internal states
2 the agent enters the main loop
3 the option generator reads the event queue, and returns a list of
options
4 the deliberator selects a subset of options to be adopted, and adds
these to the intention structure
5 the intentions to be adopted are filtered from the selected ones
6 if there is an intention to perform an atomic action at this point in
time the agent executes it
7 any external events that have occurred during the interpreter cycle are
then added to the event queue (the same for internal events)
8 the agent modifies the intention and the desire structures by dropping
successful ones
9 finally, impossible desires and intentions are dropped, too
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BDI Agents
Implementing a BDI Agent III
More formally—in some sense
Agent control loop (v. 4)
1. B:=B0;
2. I:=I0;
3. while true do
4. get new percept Γ;
5. B:=brf (Γ,B);
6. I:=deliberate(B);
8. pi:=plan(B, I);
9. execute(pi);
10. end−while
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BDI Agents
How does a BDI Agent Deliberate?
Problem
How can we made reasoning procedures of deliberation and option
generation sufficiently fast to satisfy the real time demands placed upon
the cognitive system?
deliberation can be decomposed in two phases:
option generation — understand what are the available alternatives
deliberation — choose (and filter) between the adoptable
goals/intentions
chosen options are then intentions, so the agents commit to the
selected ones—and executes them
Andrea Omicini (DISI, Univ. Bologna) C4 – Intentional Agents A.Y. 2016/2017 51 / 69
BDI Agents
Refining Deliberation Function I
option generation — the agent generates a set of possible alternatives;
represents option generation via a function, options, which
takes agent’s current beliefs and current intentions, and from
them determines a set of options (i.e., desires)
deliberation — the agent chooses between competing alternatives, and
commits to the intention to achieving them; in order to select
between competing options, an agent uses a filter function
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BDI Agents
Refining Deliberation Function II
Notes
the strategy for deliberating between goals typically is in the hands of
the agent developer
most BDI programming platforms provide mechanisms to describe
under which conditions some goal should inhibit the others (goal
formulae)
typically, such goal formulae are first-order logic predicates indicating
contexts and trigger conditions
game theory can enter the picture, here: i.e., maximising expected
utilities
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BDI Agents
BDI Agent Control Loop
Agent control loop (v. 5)
1. B:=B0;
2. I:=I0;
3. while true do
4. get new percept Γ;
5. B:=brf (Γ,B);
6. D:=options(B, I);
7. I:=filter(B,D, I);
8. pi:=plan(B, I);
9. execute(pi);
10. end−while
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BDI Agents
Structure of BDI Systems
BDI architectures are based on the following constructs
a set of beliefs
a set of desires (or goals)
a set of intentions
or better, a subset of the goals with an associated stack of plans for
achieving them; these are the intended actions
a set of internal events
elicited by a belief change (i.e., updates, addition, deletion) or by goal
events (i.e. a goal achievement, or a new goal adoption)
a set of external events
perceptive events coming form the interaction with external entities
(i.e. message arrival, signals, etc.)
a plan library (repertoire of actions) as a further (static) component
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BDI Agents
Basic Architecture of a BDI Agent [Wooldridge, 2002]
BRF
Effectors
Action
Filter
Beliefs
Desires
Intentions
Agent
Generate
Options
Sensors
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BDI Agents
Post-Declarative Systems
It was said that this approach leads to a kind of post-declarative
programming
in procedural programming, we say exactly what a system should do
in declarative programming, we state something that we want to
achieve, give the system general info about the relationships between
objects, and let a built-in control mechanism (e.g., goal-directed
theorem proving) figure out what to do
with intentional agents, we give a very abstract specification of the
system, and let the control mechanism figure out what to do, knowing
that it will act in accordance with the built-in theory of agency
Actually, the BDI framework combines in an excellent way both
(post)declarative structure and procedural knowledge in terms of plans
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Beliefs
Beliefs
Agents knowledge is structured in beliefs about the current state of the
world
they are informational units, typically implemented as ground sets of
literals, possibly with no disjunctions or implications
they should reflect only the information which is currently held (i.e.
situated)
they are expected to change in the future, i.e., as well as the
environment changes
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BDI Agents
Plans
Plans
Plans represent the means the agent has to change the world, and to bring
it closer to his desires
they are language constructs, typically implemented in the form of
procedural structures
plans have a ‘body’, describing the workflow of activities (actions)
that have to be executed for plan execution to be successful
the conditions under which a plan can be chosen as an option are
specified in an invocation condition (triggering event) and a pre- or
context- condition (situation that must hold for the plan to be
executable)
Andrea Omicini (DISI, Univ. Bologna) C4 – Intentional Agents A.Y. 2016/2017 59 / 69
BDI Agents
Intentions
Intentions
Intentions are emergent properties reified at runtime by selecting a given
plan for achieving a given goal
represented ‘on-line’ using a run-time stack of hierarchically plans
related to the ongoing adopted goals
similarly to how Prolog interpreter handle clauses
multiple intention stacks can coexist, either running in parallel,
suspended until some condition occurs, or ordered for execution in
some way
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BDI Agents
BDI Viewpoints I
There are three main viewpoints over the BDI Model [Mazal et al., 2008]:
philosophical based on the work of philosopher Bratman [Bratman, 1987],
using uses terms of folk psychology to view humans as
planning agents: the main concepts in his work are beliefs
(what an agent knows about the world), desires (what the
agent wants, can be contradictory) and intentions (desires
that the agent has decided to reach, cannot be contradictory)
logical mainly Rao and Georgeff’s BDI CTL [Rao and Georgeff, 1998] –
multimodal logics with possible world semantics –, providing
beliefs, goals (desires), and intentions with a precise logical
semantics
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BDI Agents
BDI Viewpoints II
implementation there are a huge number of systems and technologies that
are said to conform to the BDI model—between the BDI
CTL logics (very expressive) and the implementing systems.
which then treat the main modalities rather as data
structures, and mostly focus on plans
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BDI Agents
BDI Agents Programming Platforms
Jason (Brasil) http://jason.sourceforge.net/
Agent platform and language for BDI agents based on AgentSpeak(L)
JADEX (Germany) http://www.activecomponents.org/
Agent platform for BDI and Goal-Directed Agents
2APL (Netherlands) http://www.cs.uu.nl/2apl/
Agent platform providing programming constructs to implement cognitive
agents based on the BDI architecture
3APL (Netherlands) http://www.cs.uu.nl/3apl/
A programming language for implementing cognitive agents
PRACTIONIST (Italy) http://practionist.eng.it/
Framework built on the Bratman’s theory of practical reasoning to support the
development of BDI agents
ASTRA http://astralanguage.com/
A distributed / concurrent programming language based on agent-oriented
programming
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